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Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of 
pain to account for pain’s unpleasantness or painfulness.2 
Once it was common for philosophers to contrast pains with 
perceptual experiences (McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980).  It was thought that 
perceptual experiences were intentional (or content-bearing, or about 
something), whereas pains were representationally blank.  But today 
many of us reject this contrast.  For us, your having a pain in your toe is a 
matter not of your sensing “pain-ly” or encountering a sense-datum, but 
of your having an interoceptive experience representing (accurately or 
inaccurately) that your toe is in a particular experience-independent 
condition, such as undergoing a certain “disturbance” or being damaged 
or in danger (Armstrong 1962; Tye 1995).3  But even if such 
representational content makes an experience a pain, a further ingredient 
seems required to make the pain unpleasant.  According to evaluativism, 
the further ingredient is the experience’s possession of evaluative content:  
its representing the bodily condition as bad for the subject. 
Below, I elaborate evaluativism, locate it among alternatives, and 
explain its attractions and challenges. 
 
1.  LOCATING EVALUATIVISM 
 
One could use “evaluativism”, broadly, for any view invoking evaluations 
to explain pain’s unpleasantness or pain itself, whether these evaluations 
are experiences, beliefs, or desires, and whether what is evaluated are 
bodily conditions or experiences.  But I’m using the term more narrowly, 
for a view whose essentials are endorsed by Bennett Helm (2001, 2002), 
Brian Cutter and Michael Tye (2011), and myself (2013): 
 
 Evaluativism  
1. Your being in pain consists in your undergoing an 
interoceptive experience (the pain or pain experience) 
that represents a bodily condition of a certain sort. 
 
2. Your pain being unpleasant consists in its additionally 
representing that condition as bad for you.	
 
Notice the following.  First, like most accounts of unpleasant pain, this is a 
composite view, invoking distinct ingredients to explain pain and its 
unpleasantness respectively.  This structure makes room for pains that are 
not unpleasant (see §2.3).  Suppose your pain yesterday was unpleasant 
and your otherwise identical pain today isn’t (thanks to morphine, say). 
For evaluativists, this is a matter of the two pains representing the same 
kind of bodily condition, but only yesterday’s representing it as bad for 
you.4 
Second, evaluativism is a first-order view.  It explains pains’ 
unpleasantness in terms of states directed at the extramental world, not at 
other mental states.  In particular, crucially, the badness that evaluativism 
says pains represent is the badness not of pains, but of certain bodily 
conditions.5  As I’ll put it, they represent bodily or b-badness. 
 Third, evaluativism is a content view.  It says that a pain’s being 
unpleasant consists in its having the right representational content.  
Contrast functionalist views that say a pain’s unpleasantness consists in its 
causal role or mode of processing, where this is not taken to constitute the 
possession of content (Aydede 2014; Aydede and Fulkerson forthcoming; 
see §3.2 below).  
 Fourth, evaluativism is a cognitivist view, in the sense that it not 
only explains pain’s unpleasantness in terms of content, but says that 
pains have, partly in virtue of their unpleasantness, truth-conditions.  
Contrast those imperativist views that explain pain’s unpleasantness in 
terms of the receipt of body-issued, experiential commands, such as “Stop 
this bodily condition!” (Hall 2008; Klein 2007; Martinez 2011).6,7 
Finally, evaluativism is a phenomenological view, taking your 
pain’s unpleasantness to constitute part of what it is like for you to undergo 
your pain.  It might even be elaborated as a feeling view, in the sense of a 
view on which a pain’s unpleasantness is not only phenomenal, but 
phenomenal in a way that non-perceptual, central states such as beliefs and 
desires are not.  (For some reason, however, “feeling view” is usually 
reserved in the literature for views rejecting intentional explanations of the 
relevant feeling [Rachels 2000; Bramble 2011].) 
2 
	
Illustrating the preceding remarks, we might contrast 
evaluativism with two desire views:  the first-order desire view (FOD) 
and—the orthodoxy—the second-order desire view (SOD).  These 
respectively substitute for evaluativism’s second claim—(2) above— 
something like the following: 
 
FOD  
3.  Your pain being unpleasant consists in your having 
an experience-based intrinsic desire that that bodily 
condition represented by the pain not obtain. (Jacobson 




4.  Your pain being unpleasant consists in your having 
an intrinsic desire that your pain experience not occur.  
(Armstrong 1962; Pitcher 1970; Heathwood 2007; Brady 
2015) 
 
Both desire views differ from evaluativism. SOD, after all, is a second-
order account.  And, assuming that desires lack truth-conditions and lack 
the kind of phenomenology that perceptual experiences have, neither SOD 
nor FOD is a cognitivist or feeling view.9 
 
2.  MOTIVATING EVALUATIVISM 
 
2.1.  Representationalism, Affective Intensity, and Pain Talk 
Why be an evaluativist?  Brian Cutter and Michael Tye’s answer focuses 
on the representationalist idea that an experience’s phenomenal character 
consists in its representational content (2011).10  If representationalism is to 
be accepted, a pain’s unpleasantness—assuming its phenomenality—had 
better be explicable in terms of its content.  If evaluativism is right, it is. 
 But what reason is there to reach for evaluative contents 
specifically?  Cutter and Tye are led to do so by a process of elimination.  
They worry that pain’s unpleasantness undermines their 
representationalism, since their psychosemantics—their account of the 
determinants of perceptual content (§3.3)—allows for two pains to differ in 
unpleasantness while being identical in respect of descriptive contents:  
contents concerning, for instance, the shape, location, and type of 
disturbance represented.  But representationalism and their 
psychosemantics survive, they argue, provided unpleasant pains also have 
non-descriptive, evaluative content, since their psychosemantics predicts 
the two pains will—for all their intentional overlap—differ in respect of 
how bad for oneself they represent the disturbances as being (2011:  96, 98-
101). 
 Another reason some think evaluative contents a promising 
candidate for explaining pains’ unpleasantness is that, like 
unpleasantness, b-badness admits of degrees.  This allows us to explain 
differing intensities of pain’s unpleasantness as follows.  Just as a visual 
experience might represent one wall as brighter than it represents another, 
your interoceptive experience might represent one disturbance as worse for 
you than it represents another (Cutter and Tye 2011:  98, 104).  Alternative 
explanations, evaluativists argue, are considerably less attractive (Cutter 
and Tye 2011: 103-105; Bain 2011).11 
 It is also occasionally hinted that evaluativism is supported by 
our tendency to report—when, say, our feet hurt—that things (or our feet) 
feel bad.  But such utterances are not really probative, since they might 
alternatively be interpreted in ways not requiring evaluativism, for 
instance as saying that the feeling we’re having is itself bad, or that our feet 
are in a state that is causing a bad feeling, or that we are having an 
experience that allows us to infer—without its representing—that our feet 
are in a bad state. 
 
2.2.  Motivation and Rationalization 
To appreciate another route to evaluativism, suppose you are standing in 
front of a boulder and see that it is wide.  This visual experience, many 
think, is not itself motivational.12  You will be moved to act only given 
further, motivational states of yours, such as a desire to walk around the 
boulder.  Consider now another case:  your hand is dangling in water that 
is hot enough to cause unpleasant pain, but not to trigger a reflex.  Many 
think that, by contrast with your visual experience, this  unpleasant pain is 
itself motivational, perhaps motivating you to lift your hand from the 
water, and doing so without the need for further motivational states such 
as a desire to not feel pain or damage your hand (though you may yet not 
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lift your hand if—say—your pain is overridden by a stronger motivation, 
e.g. a desire to recover a wedding ring from the hot water.)  Now, 
according to some, what explains the contrast between your motivational 
pain and your inert visual experience is that the former alone has 
evaluative content (Helm 2002, Bain 2013). 
 The point is not just that unpleasant pains motivate, but how they 
do so.  Rather than brutely causing movement, the idea goes, pains are 
motivating reasons, rationalizing action (Helm 2002; Bain 2013; Bain in 
preparation-a).  Again, the way your pain explains your lifting your hand 
contrasts with the way the fullness of a volcano’s magma chamber 
explains its eruption.  Like belief-desire explanations of action, pain 
explanations are perspectival and normative.  An explanation of your 
hand-lifting in terms of your pain allows me to put myself in your shoes 
and see from your perspective why your action should have seemed 
reasonable to you.  In short, pains figure in rationalizations; and crucially, 
evaluativists argue, they do so courtesy of their evaluative content.  In 
particular, they are motivating reasons by dint of representing justifying 
reasons:  you are moved to lift your hand because your pain represents a 
good reason for doing so, namely your hand’s bad state. 
 Other views arguably make less good sense of unpleasant pains 
as motivating reasons.  Imperativism, for instance, models pains on 
commands.  But a child might command you to stand without your 
having any inclination to do so (Bain 2011).  And even were the command 
issued by a police officer, and you obeyed, what motivated and 
rationalized your standing would arguably not be the command per se, 
but further motivational states, such as a desire not to be arrested (Bain 
2011; 2013; in preparation-a).13 
 Might a desire view prove a more potent rival than 
imperativism?  Competing conceptions of desire complicate the answer.  
For instance, one view—an attempt to make sense of the rationalizing 
capacity of desire—is that desires are truth-apt, experience-like evaluative 
episodes:  your wanting the beer, for instance, involves it striking you as 
good (Oddie 2005, Helm 2002).  Now, on this conception, some desire 
views of pain risk collapsing into evaluativism.  In particular, FOD’s body-
directed desires start to look a lot like evaluativism’s body-directed 
evaluative experiences.14 
Alternative conceptions of desire avert the threat of collapse.  But 
some doubt that desires on these alternative conceptions can rationalize.  
Moreover, even if they can, evaluativism arguably still makes better sense 
than desire views of pain’s rationalizing role.  For pains arguably 
constitute a distinctive category of motivation, intermediate between brute 
causes, on the one hand, and desires, on the other (Bain in preparation-a).  
While pains rationalize, they are nonetheless more basic than desires:  
more peripheral, less (in one sense) cognitive.  They are, it might be said, 
reason-constituting urges, not instances of your wanting to act in this or 
that way, or to achieve this or that end, but rather ways in which the world 
(in particular, your own body) gives you reasons for action, reasons 
indeed for desire, rather as visual experiences are not themselves judgments, 
but ways in which the world gives you reasons for judgment (Evans 1982, 
McDowell 1994, O’Sullivan and Schroer 2012).  This picture belongs with 
the idea that pain’s unpleasantness is an experiential, phenomenal matter 
(§1).  Like that idea, some will reject it.  But evaluativists are not alone in 
finding it attractive.15  And evaluativism is a compelling way of 
accommodating it.16  
 
2.3.  Extending Evaluativism 
Evaluativism arguably illuminates more than the intensity and 
rationalizing capacity of pain’s unpleasantness.   
 There are, for instance, data that some construe as showing that 
beliefs evaluating bodily conditions can influence the unpleasantness of 
the pains those conditions cause.  In one case, for instance, it is suggested 
that soldiers’ beliefs that their wounds had saved them from an horrific 
battlefield made the pains those wounds caused less unpleasant (Hall 
1989, Beecher 1959).  If real, this phenomenon can be attractively explained 
by evaluativism as a case of cognitive penetration, involving our doxastic 
evaluations of bodily conditions having a top-down influence on our 
experiential evaluations of the same conditions.17 
 Evaluativism also illuminates pain asymbolia, a bizarre and rare 
disorder resulting from brain damage (Berthier et al 1988).18  Asymbolics, 
when pinched and the like, say they feel pain.  But, remarkably, they deny 
it is unpleasant and don’t attempt to prevent or stop the stimuli.  Call 
these anomalies their pain deficits.  Less often reported are their non-pain 
deficits:  the ways in which they fail to respond even to bodily threats they 
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do not claim are causing pain, for instance threats that are issued verbally 
or presented only in visual experience.  So what might explain both sets of 
deficits?  Colin Klein’s answer is that asymbolics’ brain damage makes 
them incapable of a basic kind of care about their own bodies (2015a).  But 
while this would illuminate their non-pain deficits—they don’t protect 
bodies they don’t care about—how might it explain their pain deficits, in 
particular their pain’s not being unpleasant?    Evaluativism supplies an 
attractive answer (Bain 2014).  Caring about x is plausibly a condition on 
representing threats to x as bad for you (Helm 2002).  Hence it is argued 
that, just as you won’t regard a threat to a vase as bad for you if you don’t 
care about the vase, so too your interoceptive experience won’t represent a 
condition of your body as bad for you—hence won’t be unpleasant—if 
you don’t care about your body.19 
Evaluativism is also attractively adaptable.  It can be tweaked to 
account for sensory unpleasantness in general, and sensory pleasure too.  
For instance, the latter might be taken to involve experiences representing 
certain circumstances as good for oneself.  Consider, by contrast, an 
imperativist view on which an unpleasant pain in your foot is a command 
to protect your foot.  It is unclear how this might be tweaked to account for 
other unpleasures, let alone pleasure.20  Notice, finally, that standard 
accounts of emotions such as grief invoke evaluative states.  Hence 
evaluativism about pain might be the key to capturing the intuitive 




3.1.  Bodily Badness 
One challenge for evaluativists is to say something sensible about the 
nature of b-badness.22  If b-badness seems spooky, one worry goes, then 
those like Cutter and Tye who adopt evaluativism to avert the threat that 
pain’s unpleasantness poses to naturalism have really only deferred the 
problem.   
 Cutter and Tye try to meet the demand by explaining b-badness 
as an objective, natural property, explicable without reference to mental 
states.  A bodily condition’s badness for you, they claim, is its aptness to 
harm your body, in the sense of impeding its proper functioning in a 
Darwinian sense (2011: 99-100).  This account’s naturalistic purity is 
attractive; but some may fear that harmfulness in this sense is 
insufficiently normative to sustain the sorts of arguments for evaluativism 
sketched in §2.2:  that a state’s b-badness for you defeasibly justifies your 
intrinsically desiring that state to end, for instance, or that representations 
of b-badness can themselves rationalize action. 
 We might alternatively construe b-badness as subjective.  One 
subjectivist view identifies a bodily condition’s being b-bad for you with 
its frustrating an intrinsic desire of yours.  This, notice, is not FOD. 
Whereas FOD explains pain’s unpleasantness in terms of a desire for an 
experientially represented bodily condition to cease, the current view 
explains it in terms of an experience representing the desire-frustrating-
ness (if you will) of a bodily condition, albeit representing that property 
not as such but under the mode of presentation, being bad for me [Bain in 
preparation-b; see also §3.3 below]).23  
 A different subjectivism identifies a bodily condition’s being b-
bad for you with its causing—or being disposed to cause—unpleasant 
pains in you.  Most evaluativists eschew such accounts, perhaps worried 
that explaining unpleasantness in terms of the representation of b-badness 
would be viciously circular if b-badness is in turn explained in terms of 
the production of unpleasantness experiences.    It is worth noticing, 
however, that some philosophers are happy to explain the phenomenal 
character of an object’s looking red in terms of the visual representation of 
redness, even while explaining redness in terms of an object’s disposition 
to cause experiences with that character (McDowell 1994).  
 There are yet other approaches to b-badness, some modeled on 
metaethical accounts of moral badness.  Helm holds a no-priority view of 
b-badness (2001),24 for instance, and there is also room for a projectivist or 
error theory according to which b-badness is represented but never 
instantiated.  But I shall not explore or add to these options here. 
Another challenge for evaluativists, less often noticed, is to 
ensure their specifications of pain’s neutral, pain-constituting content and  
its evaluative, unpleasantness-constituting content cohere.  Some, for 
instance, take pain’s neutral content to represent “bodily disturbances”, a 
phrase some use to refer to nociceptor activity (Armstrong 1968: 315, 319).  
But it is implausible that nociceptor activity might be accurately 
represented as bad for you, at least on some accounts of b-badness.  
Sometimes, Cutter and Tye instead take pain’s neutral content to represent 
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“tissue damage” (2011: 91-92).  But there is a worry here too, for your foot’s 
being damaged is not obviously distinct from your foot’s being in a state apt to 
harm you, which content Cutter and Tye invoke in their account of pain’s 
distinct evaluative content.25   Sometimes, they seem inclined to say that 
pains represent only determinate kinds of damage:  one representing a toe 
as burned, say, another a finger as cut (2011: 92).  But unless these two 
experiences represent the cut and burn as instances of damage, or at least 
some common kind, it is unclear what representational commonality 
makes them both pains. 
In short, while evaluativists (including me) often intend the 
phrase “bodily disturbances” only as a promissory note for an account of 
pain’s neutral content, cashing that note may turn out to be a challenge.26 
 
3.2.  Evaluative Content 
Worries about b-badness go hand-in-hand with worries about its 
perceptual representation.  Evaluativism’s critics argue, for instance, that 
if Cutter and Tye’s account of b-badness and their psychosemantics were 
both correct, then b-badness could not be perceptually represented 
(Aydede 2006). 
 On Cutter and Tye’s psychosemantics, your current experience 
represents blue (say) just in case the following holds:  in the circumstances 
in which the human visual system evolved, you undergo experiences of 
your current experience’s type if and only if and because something blue is 
present.  As we might put it, perceptual representation consists in 
experience types tracking properties in ancestral circumstances.  Why think 
this rules out the interoceptive representation of b-badness as Cutter and 
Tye understand it?  One reason is that the “because” in Cutter and Tye’s 
psychosemantics seems to require, in order for b-badness to be 
perceptually represented, that it cause the tracking states; but Cutter and 
Tye think b-badness is an extrinsic property—the same cut to your hand 
might be very bad for you in a bacteria-rich environment but only 
moderately bad for you in a cleaner environment—which some think 
prevents it being causally efficacious. 
As well as entertaining non-causal interpretations of the crucial 
“because”, Cutter and Tye insist that extrinsic properties in general and b-
badness in particular can cause (2011: 101-102).  To see this, begin by 
noticing that Cutter and Tye characterize the tracking states in the pain 
case functionally.  One kind of tracking state, for instance, is what we might 
call H-states, states whose role is to produce a high degree of damage-
avoidance behavior.  Suppose, then, that you right now have a cut finger; 
that you are in ancestral (bacteria-rich) circumstances; and that you are in 
an H state.  Surely, Cutter and Tye argue, it is—thanks to natural 
selection—because conditions of your cut’s intrinsic type cause severe harm 
in ancestral circumstances—that is, are very bad for humans in those 
circumstances—that they typically cause H states in humans in those 
circumstances, hence that yours causes an H state in you now (2011:  100-
101).  Others, however, will question whether this shows that your current 
cut’s aptness to harm you caused your H state.   They will point out that 
the very same cut as caused an H state in you now in ancestral 
circumstances would have caused the very same H state in you even in 
cleaner, non-ancestral circumstances, circumstances in which the cut would 
not have been apt to severely harm you, that is (crucially) would not have 
been very bad for you.  So it can seem to be the cut’s intrinsic properties 
rather than its severe badness for you that causes the H state.  The debate 
continues.27 
There is, notice, no obligation for other evaluativists to follow 
Cutter and Tye’s lead in trying to explain pain’s evaluative content within 
the strictures of their tracking psychosemantics.  For one thing, other 
psychosemantics exist. One possibility, for instance, is a functionalist 
psychosemantics on which an experience’s occupying the right functional 
role constitutes its possession of evaluative content. This appeal to 
functional role, notice, contrasts with Aydede and Fulkerson’s (§1):  it is an 
explanation of, not an alternative to, evaluative content.28 
It must be admitted that other evaluativists, including me, have 
said little about what if any psychosemantics we have in mind.  But three 
points assuage the worry that we are simply ignoring an obvious problem.  
First, it is quite unclear that anyone has, in respect of any perceptual 
contents, an acceptable reductive psychosemantics.  Second, you need not 
be a dualist to think no reductive account can be given. Finally, beyond 
the pain case—regarding emotional experience, for instance, and vision 
too—the idea that experiences might enjoy so-called high-level contents, 
concerning (for instance) natural kinds, affordances, threats, or indeed 
values is rather widespread.  In crediting pains with evaluative content, it 
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is not clear that evaluativists are saying anything more outré than what is 
often said in other cases. 
 
3.3.  The Badness of Unpleasantness 
Recall that the badness that evaluativists think pain’s unpleasantness 
represents is not the badness of pain or its unpleasantness (§1).  That 
unpleasant pain is bad, however, indeed non-instrumentally bad, i.e. bad 
independently of the badness of its consequences, can seem like common-
sense.  And this, four critics have argued, poses a problem for 
evaluativism (Aydede and Fulkerson forthcoming; Brady 2015; and 
Jacobson 2013). 
Evaluativism takes your unpleasant pain to consist in your 
undergoing a representation that a body part of yours is in a state that is 
bad for you—yet this representational state, the critics argue, is not itself a 
state that it would be non-instrumentally bad to be in.  After all, 
experiences rarely instantiate the properties they represent; a visual 
experience of a cube is not itself cuboid.  So why think an experience 
representing badness-for-you is itself bad for you (non-instrumentally)?  
The critics often make the point in terms of belief.  Suppose you believe 
you’re terminally ill and that your being so is bad for you.  If your belief is 
true, then of course your situation is indeed bad for you.  But is your 
believing it is bad for you additionally bad for you (non-instrumentally)?  
Does it itself make your situation non-instrumentally worse?  Surely not, 
they argue.  And we should say the same about any representations that 
things are bad for you, including the interoceptive experiences with which 
evaluativists identify unpleasant pains.  Call this the normative objection.29 
 The problem might be side-stepped by denying the non-
instrumental badness of unpleasant pain, as some non-evaluativists do 
(Martinez 2015).  But, to my mind rightly, evaluativists have not taken this 
route, denying that the badness of pain’s unpleasantness is entirely a 
matter of its bad effects, such as anxiety and distraction (Bain in 
preparation-b).  
 Another response is to question whether the critics themselves 
can accommodate the badness of pain’s unpleasantness.  The critics tend 
to explain the badness of unpleasant pain in terms of some notion of 
desire-frustration.  But three of them embrace something like FOD, which 
arguably compromises their explanation.30  Suppose you have an 
unpleasant pain in your foot that you know to be caused not by a 
condition of the foot, but by a central neuropathy. FOD says your pain’s 
unpleasantness consists in a foot-directed desire for the pain-represented 
state of damage (say) not to obtain.  The problem is that this desire is not 
frustrated, or even believed to be frustrated. 
The critics might reply that you nonetheless experience desire-
frustration.  But what does this mean?  Perhaps that your experience 
represents (illusorily) a state of affairs that, though you know it doesn’t, 
would frustrate a desire of yours if it obtained.  But it is unclear that this 
situation would be non-instrumentally bad for you.  Perhaps, instead, the 
idea is that the property you experience a state of your foot as 
instantiating is desire-frustrating-ness, even if not under that mode of 
presentation.  But if, as seems plausible, the mode of presentation under 
which you represent it is being bad for me, this suggestion collapses into 
evaluativism, in particular the version that explains b-badness in terms of 
desire-frustration (§3.1; Bain in preparation-b). 
 Evaluativists can also respond to the normative objection more 
positively.  One strategy is to explain your pain’s badness in terms of your 
intrinsic desire for its unpleasantness not to obtain (Cutter and Tye 2014; 
Bain in preparation-b).  This strategy should not be confused with 
instrumentalism or SOD.  It does not explain the badness of pain’s 
unpleasantness in terms of the badness of its consequences; and the idea is 
not that pain’s unpleasantness consists in anti-pain desires, but that the 
badness of pain’s unpleasantness consists in anti-unpleasantness desires.  
However, the strategy has consequences some find awkward.  Suppose 
that, instead of having anti-unpleasantness desires, a person (call her 
Strangelove) intrinsically wants the continuation of her pains’ 
unpleasantness.  Except in respect of their practical inconsistency with her 
other desires, Strangelove’s pro-unpleasantness desires are not rationally 
criticizable, for they are directed at nothing antecedently bad.  Moreover, 
they render her pains’ unpleasantness non-instrumentally good for her. 
 An alternative strategy avoids these consequences (Bain in 
preparation-b).  It starts by disentangling what is being asked of 
evaluativists.  Suppose the question is:  “Why think that experientially 
representing that your body is in a condition that is bad for you is itself 
bad for you, given that believing it is bad for you is not?”  Given that 
question, evaluativism itself is arguably a plausible answer.  For it is 
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plausible, evaluativists argue, that your pain’s felt unpleasantness consists 
in your experientially representing—contrast believing—that your body is 
in a state that is bad for you.  So, if we are right, it is plausible that if pain’s 
unpleasantness is non-instrumentally bad for you, then experientially 
representing the badness-for-you of certain bodily states is also non-
instrumentally bad for you.  This would be question-begging if the case 
for evaluativism were based on the non-instrumental badness of such 
representations.  But, as we have seen, it isn’t. 
If the question is instead, “Can evaluativism explain the non-
instrumental badness of pain’s unpleasantness?”, evaluativists might 
reply that normative explanation comes to an end somewhere.  FOD 
theorists, after all, invoke desire-frustration to explain pain’s badness 
while tending not to say what is bad about desire-frustration.  If such 
quietism is permissible, it should be available to evaluativists too.  
 Suppose, finally, the question is, “If the badness of an unpleasant 
pain consists in its content, why isn’t a belief with the same content also 
bad?”  In reply, evaluativists might note the parallel with the following 
question, sometimes put to representationalists:  “If the phenomenal 
character of a visual experience that a red apple is before you consists in 
its content, why doesn’t a belief with the same content have the same 
phenomenal character as the experience?”  The parallel is illuminating 
because if you take pain’s unpleasantness to be an aspect of how it feels, as 
some evaluativists do (§1), an answer to the latter question might also 
answer the former.  Again, something more generally needed might also 
meet the normative objection:  an account of why the content of a 
perceptual experience constitutively contributes to a feel in a way in which 
the content of a belief does not.  And even the barest sketch of what 
philosophers say on this front is suggestive in the present context. 
For instance, some say that a visual experience of a red apple—
unlike a belief that a red apple is before you—is an episode in which you 
do not merely represent but putatively encounter an apple and its redness, 
or are acquainted or in contact with it, or have the apple putatively present 
to you.  Sometimes, these ideas are fleshed out via a broadly Kantian 
distinction between spontaneity and receptivity—between thinking, 
construed as a process you are in some sense in charge of, and 
experiencing, construed as a process in which the world instead impresses 
itself on your senses.  Now, if the idea of the non-instrumental badness of 
representing that a situation is bad for you is uncompelling, evaluativists 
might well point out that we do not invoke just any representations; we 
invoke episodes in which you putatively encounter or have impressed on 
you the badness of your situation, in which its badness is putatively 
present to you.  The idea that episodes of this sort should themselves be 
bad for you is considerably more compelling.  The metaphors need 
cashing, of course, but that is something philosophers of perception are 
working to do.  In short, there is an alternative to answering the normative 
objection in terms of second-order desires. 
A residual worry, concerning motivation, remains.  Construing 
unpleasant pains as representations of the badness of bodily conditions, 
evaluativism explains how pains motivate actions aimed at minimizing 
those bodily conditions (§2.2).  But it does not explain what motivates 
behavior aimed at pain itself, such as the taking of painkillers.  Even if 
evaluativists can explain what justifies taking painkillers, the worry goes, 
they cannot explain what motivates it.  But replies are available (Bain in 
preparation-b).  Evaluativists might argue, for instance, that whether or 
not anti-unpleasantness desires explain the badness of pain’s 
unpleasantness, such desires exist and are what motivates our reaching for 







• 2. Pain and representation (Cutter) 
• 4. Pain as imperative (Klein) 
• 9. Somatic perception Theory of Pain (Price) 
• 15. Social pain theory (Borsook and MacDonald) 
• 23. Pain and cognitive penetration (Jacobson) 
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1 This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation.   
2 “Unpleasantness” and “painfulness” aren’t synonyms.  Nausea is 
unpleasant but not painful.  But “is painful” may yet mean “is an 
unpleasant pain”. 
3 See Chapters 9 (Price) and 2 (Cutter). 
4 Helm (2002:  notes 2 and 28) may not intend a composite view. 
5 Klein, by contrast, approves of a view on which a pain’s unpleasantness 
consists in the evaluation of the pain (2015b: 185). 
6	Imperativists tend to think contents (contrast sentences) have moods, e.g. 
indicative and imperative (Martinez 2011: 79-81).  My formulation of 
cognitivism remains neutral on this.  Cognitivism might also be put in 
terms of “direction of fit”, but see Bain (2013: s84) for complications. 	
7 See also Chapter 4 (Klein).  Notice that Klein 2015b explains only pain, 
not its unpleasantness, in terms of commands.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 				
8 In fact Aydede and Fulkerson invoke only “desire-like” states.   Not 
everything I say about FOD, e.g. that it’s not a feeling view, applies to 
their position. 
9 Klein’s account of pain’s unpleasantness sometimes appears to invoke 
(second-order) judgements.  If so, it is also not a feeling view (2015b: 186).  
Nelkin’s oft-cited approach invokes (first-order) judgements, but it is an 
account of pain, not its unpleasantness (1994). 
10 See also Chapter 2 (Cutter). 
11 See Klein and Martinez (forthcoming) for reply. 
12 This allows that some visual experiences are motivational, as for instance 
Siegel thinks those representing “mandates” are (2014). 
13 For reply, see Klein 2015b. 
14 This conception is also problematic for SOD (Bain 2013: S79-S80). 
15 Hall 2008: 530-532; Klein 2015b: 17, 128. 
16 See Chapter 20 (Fulkerson and Cohen). 
17 On cognitive penetration, see Stokes 2013 and Chapter 23 (Jacobson). 
18 See Chapter 32 (Sapien-Cordoba). 
19 Against Klein’s and my appeal to “care-lack”, see de Vignemont 2015. 
20	 I assume this is one reason Klein’s imperativism (invoking protective 
commands) is an account of pain, not its unpleasantness (Klein 2015b).  
Martinez’s imperativism (which is an account of its unpleasantness) looks 
easier to extend; but see Cutter and Tye 2011: 105.	
21 See Chapter 15 (Borsook and MacDonald). 
22 See also Chapter 28 (Massin). 
23 Schroeder explains unpleasantness in terms of experiential 
representations that one’s intrinsic desires as a whole are on balance less well 
satisfied than expected (2004: 97). 
24 Aspects of Helm’s story are redolent of both the desire-frustration 
account and the  allegedly circular account just mentioned. 
25 They might say damage is harm whereas b-badness is aptness to harm.  
But the resulting view would be unattractive:  that your unpleasant pain 
represents a condition both as harming you and as apt to harm you. 
26 Kindred challenges include assigning different bodily sensations (e.g. 
pain and itch) different neutral contents, and assigning different 




																																								 																																							 																																							 				
27 See also Chapter 2 (Cutter). 
28 Cutter and Tye’s functional characterisations of the tracking states may 
seem to approximate this approach.   
29 It is also known as the messenger-shooting objection (Bain 2013; 
Jacobson 2013 and in preparation).  
30 The exception is Brady (2015). 
 
 
